From Afghanistan to Gaza — When War Hides Among Civilians

By: Former Member of the Targeting Board, Afghan Ministry of Defense (2017–2021) In every war, the line between “legitimate defense” and “civilian casualties” is far thinner than it appears from the outside. I have seen this reality firsthand — during my years at the Afghan Ministry of Defense, I was responsible for reviewing and approving airstrike operations. Today, when I look at Gaza, I see the same scenario — only on a larger scale and in a far more densely populated geography. I focused only on the technical aspects and the parts I found essential. I chose not to include the legal dimension — partly because legal debates around this issue have already become overly saturated, and partly because I don’t believe the law can offer a truly rational answer in this particular case. This analysis is therefore focused on operational realities rather than legal debates. In Afghanistan, our official policy was clear: no airstrike could target a mosque, school, hospital, or civilian home — even if the enemy was taking cover inside. The minimum safe distance for any strike was 152 meters from civilian areas. Each mission had to pass through multiple layers of approval, a process that could take up to three days. But the Taliban exploited these restrictions. They took positions among civilians, in schoolyards, and even in graveyards. Their goal was clear: to avoid airstrikes while putting Afghan ground forces under pressure. When we could not deliver air support near civilian areas, the Taliban would attack army bases at night with hundreds of fighters, killing soldiers and seizing weapons. Every time a civilian died in an airstrike, Taliban propaganda networks, along with some media and international bodies like UNAMA, amplified the incident. Public pressure became so intense that no commander was willing to approve a mission with even a minimal risk of civilian casualties. The result? Our operational freedom was effectively paralyzed. The Taliban moved freely while we fought with our hands tied. I see the same pattern today in Gaza — only with exponentially greater intensity and complexity. Gaza, with an area of approximately 360 square kilometers and over 2.2 million residents, is one of the most densely populated regions in the world. In each square kilometer, over 6,000 people live. In this environment, Hamas hides its military infrastructure beneath buildings, streets, and hospitals. From these positions, they launch rockets, relocate forces, and deliberately put civilians at risk to use their casualties as political and media leverage against Israel. In this context, the Israeli Air Force faces exactly the same dilemma we faced in Afghanistan — but on a far more compressed and ruthless scale. Israeli pilots, if they wanted to achieve zero civilian casualties, would essentially have to refrain from combat. But doing so would allow Hamas to maintain its threat and carry out deadly attacks like those on October 7. Israel has repeatedly issued evacuation warnings before strikes; yet many civilians either refused to leave or were prevented by Hamas from evacuating, while Egypt’s crossings remained closed. In such circumstances, any airstrike inevitably causes casualties — casualties for which the primary responsibility lies not with the pilots, but with those who deliberately wage war amid the civilian population. Operationally, civilian casualties in Gaza are tragic and devastating, but they cannot be classified as “genocide.” Genocide is the deliberate intent to destroy a people. What is happening in Gaza is the result of warfare conducted amid civilians — a strategy designed by Hamas that Israel is forced to respond to. My experience in Afghanistan offers a clear lesson: when the enemy moves the battlefield into the homes of civilians, the civilians are the first victims. As long as this tactic continues, no army in the world can restore security without civilian casualties. A stark warning: Afghanistan also showed that when our government listened only to the media, UNAMA, and “human rights entrepreneurs” — letting public pressure dictate operational decisions — the result was a humiliating defeat and the collapse of the battlefield against the Taliban. If Israel were to follow the same path, listening solely to media and human rights pressures, it would likely face the same fate Afghanistan did.